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Chapter 11
Results of Current Models
This chapter provides some perspective on current results and modeling efforts,
taking into account what we have already discussed about the climate system,
climate models, and uncertainty. Rather than present detailed results from climate
models, which will change as model versions change, we use selected results of
recent climate model simulations to characterize and frame the uncertainties we
have already discussed. The goal is to understand the uncertainty in climate model
predictions of the future. A prediction without uncertainty, or with the wrong
uncertainty, may be worse than no prediction at all. For example, if the prediction is
for a temperature of 34 °F (1 °C) with precipitation and the actual temperature is
28 °F (−2 °C), the prediction is still correct if the uncertainty is ±6 °F (3 °C) or
more. But if you do not have the uncertainty range, and you assume the temperature
is going to be above freezing, then you might not have planned for snow rather than
rain, or for freezing rain and ice. If you knew the uncertainty was large, you would
plan for snow and ice.
The discussion also provides examples of the predictions of current climate
models and the level of uncertainty. First, we briefly review some of the history and
organization of modeling efforts. Second, we discuss what we want to know
(predict) and how to use uncertainty. Third, we review the conﬁdence in current
predictions. Our goal is to frame the uncertainty with speciﬁc examples to assist the
reader in assessing models for their needs and applications.
11.1 Organization of Climate Model Results
Individual model results have been published over the past 30 years. The number of
models has grown and the number of different publications increased. In 1995, the
ﬁrst Coupled Model Inter-comparison Project (CMIP)1 was started to compare
1World Climate Research Program, “Coupled Model Intercomparison Project,” http://cmip-pcmdi.
llnl.gov.
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different models. The project has expanded in parallel with the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)2 scientiﬁc assessments. Information and results
from the current CMIP model submissions (the ﬁfth round: CMIP5) were used in
the 2013 IPCC Assessment Report,3 the ﬁfth such report. The CMIP project con-
tains data from about 28 different modeling centers (groups of scientists that design
and run climate models). The output from many different simulations for the past
and future is generally freely available for use, and is being continually used in new
ways by scientists and for applications research (as is described in more detail in
Chap. 12). The results described in this chapter largely come from this large set of
simulations. New models are in development for another round (CMIP6); the
rounds occur about every 7 years or so. New models are typically released and run
to coincide with the IPCC reports, at least over the past few cycles (from about
2001 to the present).
The IPCC scientiﬁc assessments are the best and most comprehensive entry
point for looking at model predictions. In this book, we are concerned mostly with
the physical climate system, which is treated by IPCC Working Group 1, whose
focus is on the physical science basis for climate change. IPCC Working Group 2
looks at impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability of human systems; and IPCC
Working Group 3 is focused on mitigation from an economic and policy per-
spective. Working Groups 2 and 3 also use physical climate models in their
analysis. The reports are freely available from the IPCC. In the ﬁfth IPCC
assessment report, climate models are evaluated in Chap. 9, and results are spread
throughout the IPCC report. Some selected results are reprinted in this chapter to
illustrate the uncertainty in climate model results.
11.2 Prediction and Uncertainty
Before discussing results, it is worthwhile to frame the discussion of prediction and
uncertainty by asking what we really want to know. This would seem like a simple
question, but what we want to know, and how conﬁdent we are in the predictions, is
very important for understanding how to use climate models.
Recall the terminology. We often use the word prediction, but we really mean
projection. A prediction implies something will happen with some probability.
A forecast is a prediction. There are multiple possible climate pathways, subject to
several types of uncertainty. On long time and large space scales, the scenario
uncertainty dominates (see Chap. 10). But only one solution will result. So we are
really talking about multiple projections: if a given scenario happens, then this
2Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, http://www.ipcc.ch.
3IPCC. (2013). “Summary for Policymakers.” In T. F. Stocker, et al., eds. Climate Change 2013:
The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
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model projects that a certain climate will result. So the goal is to ﬁgure out (project)
all possible states of the climate system. In some ways the multiple projections
deﬁne a complete prediction of the possible states: This includes the scenario
uncertainty and the model uncertainty. To really understand the possible future
state, both types of uncertainty must be considered, but scenario uncertainty is
currently outside of the models (it is an imposed forcing, generated with other
models). Integrated assessment models would include this uncertainty and predict
greenhouse gas emissions, but these models also have their own assumptions, like
population projections that go into them.
Physical scientists like to think of a climate system forced by a human system.
But the human system is really part of the climate system (the anthroposphere,
discussed in Chap. 7). Thus projections of the human system are also possible, and
are coupled with the climate system. Scenarios of human forcing for climate change
also have constraints and can be modeled with human and economic system models
(as opposed to physical models). These models also have to be realistic. That gets a
bit more difﬁcult. Whereas the laws of physics state that matter and energy is
conserved, money is not conserved, and the “laws” of economics are complex rules
that can change. But the structure of a society and an economy can be simulated, so
that scenarios are also constrained to be realistic. For example, scenarios on
emissions of greenhouse gases are usually based on projecting current rates of
consumption and trying to estimate supply and demand curves for products like
oil whose consumption will affect climate (by releasing CO2 in the case of oil).
The emissions then form the basis of future projections. Emissions scenarios are the
predictions of integrated assessment models. The system is really a complex set of
feedbacks because these models have their own projections input to them (like
population).
11.2.1 Goals of Prediction
What exactly do we want to know from climate models? The basic answer is an
estimate of the future climate, deﬁned as the distribution of weather states. Climate
is a function of space and time (summer climate, winter climate, particular loca-
tion). We may also want an estimate of things derived from climate: stream flow,
consecutive days above or below a threshold (heat and cold waves), or with and
without precipitation (floods and droughts).
The climate of the future is a function of the uncertainties we have discussed:
initial condition uncertainty, model uncertainty, and scenario uncertainty. On short
timescales (a few days to a decade), initial condition (and internal variability)
uncertainty dominates, and on century (or half-century) timescales, scenario
uncertainty dominates. Model uncertainty remains over time, but may be signiﬁ-
cant. Model uncertainty remains signiﬁcant at small scales, where model structural
errors are important: If a model puts the storm track in the wrong place, it can
consistently move storms (i.e., weather, precipitation) in incorrect ways and create
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an error in the climate at a particular location, even while the larger-scale climate
(averaged over a continent, hemisphere, or the globe) is accurate.
The basic desire is to project all possible future weather states, given a set of
forcings. Usually there are particular aspects to climate that we seek to understand,
depending on our needs, and usually it is the extreme events (the low-probability
tails of the distribution of states) that are of concern.
11.2.2 Uncertainty
What makes a prediction useful? What really makes it useful is a good estimate of
the conﬁdence (positive connotation) or uncertainty (negative connotation) in a
prediction. In fact, a prediction without uncertainty may not be helpful. Is it going
to rain tomorrow? The answer might be “more likely than not” (a greater than 50 %
chance of rain). This forecast might be adequate if you are just going to work. You
can take an umbrella along, just in case. If you are biking to work, you might need
different clothes. But, say you are going to an outdoor wedding in the evening. That
situation demands a more detailed answer: Will it rain now or later? In this case, the
timing is important. The point is that the necessary conﬁdence to make the forecast
adequate depends on the situation. Even for one person, the needs of a prediction
change with the purpose.
Another example might be to ask about changes in the availability of water in a
particular place. Will it be wetter or drier in the future in my neighborhood? The
timescale for “future” is important. How much will it rain next week? Next season?
Next year? The next 30 years? “Next week” determines whether the garden should
be watered. “Next season” may matter for a farmer. “Next year” may matter for
someone managing a reservoir, and “the next 30 years” for someone building a
reservoir.
Uncertainty is also a function of the spatial scales involved. Global estimates
such as temperature or precipitation changes are more tightly constrained by the
nature of the physical climate system, whereas regional changes on the continental
or smaller scale are much more uncertain. One example is illustrated in Fig. 11.1,
where uncertainty is broken into two dimensions.4 One dimension involves the
different pieces of evidence that are available, such as observations, models, and
theory. Having more pieces of evidence is better. However, the other dimension is
the consensus or agreement among those lines of evidence: If models, observations,
and theory are available (three for three) and there is agreement, then results are
“established” or have high conﬁdence. However, if the three lines of evidence
disagree, then there are competing explanations. Likewise, one or two lines of
evidence may agree, but the agreement is incomplete. Speculation results from
4Moss, R. H. (2011). “Reducing Doubt About Uncertainty: Guidance for IPCC’s Third
Assessment.” Climatic Change, 108(4): 641–658. doi:10.1007/s10584-011-0182-x.
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having only one line of evidence available. Typically, it is easier to establish
evidence at the large scale (global), and as we go to smaller scales the evidence and
consensus may break down. This will clearly be seen in some of the ﬁgures that
follow from model results. Smaller scales will show less agreement than global
scales.
11.2.3 Why Models?
Why should we use climate models for prediction? Models are uncertain. They are
likely to be wrong in many ways. The statistician George Box said “essentially, all
models are wrong, but some are useful”5. Philosophically, all models are wrong in
some way. The implication is that we can use an imperfect model if we understand
its limitations. As we have shown, climate models are built on physical laws. These
provide varying levels of certainty for models. Energy and mass need to be con-
served. The fundamental laws of motion and many other physical processes are
known, but they need to be approximated to match the scale of global models (tens
of kilometers). Or, the processes are unknown or uncertain, and assumed. Note that
different climate models may be more or less useful for different predictions,
depending on how well they represent particular processes. That is part of the
evaluation of climate models.
The evaluation proceeds from a simple philosophy. Because the laws of the
physical climate system are based on physics and chemistry principles that are
invariant, we can develop a model based on the present that can simulate the present























Fig. 11.1 The different dimensions of uncertainty. The horizontal axis is the number of pieces of
evidence from observations, models and theory. The vertical axis is the consensus or agreement
level. From Moss (2011), Fig. 2
5Box, G. E. P., & Draper, N. R. (1987). Empirical Model-Building and Response Surfaces. New
York: Wiley, p. 424.
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and the past. This model can then be used to predict the future. The principle of
weather forecasts is based on this: We evaluate past forecasts to better understand
conﬁdence in forecasts of the future. But weather forecasts can be evaluated every
day. We do not have that many “climate states” to evaluate. We do have past
climates (paleo-climate) as well as recent past climates. The goal of the evaluation
of models is to determine what they are useful for, recognizing that they are
imperfect representations of the climate system. More details of evaluation were
discussed in Chap. 9.
11.3 What Is the Conﬁdence in Predictions?
The key part of this chapter is assessing the conﬁdence in predictions. We have
already noted that having multiple lines of evidence agree is critical, and global
estimates are more certain than those for smaller regions. Now we turn to speciﬁc
examples and classes of model predictions to examine when models are established,
or conﬁdent, to when they are speculative. For illustration, we use results from the
most recent (2013) Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
assessment.
The IPCC uses a controlled vocabulary for uncertainty, and links that vocabulary
to quantitative statistical language.6 One goal was to provide precision to terms
such as almost certain, unlikely, and doubtful. Table 11.1 from the IPCC supporting
material for the 5th assessment report7 illustrates that the assessment language
means something speciﬁc.
Table 11.1 Terms and
likelihood estimates
Terma Likelihood of the outcome
Virtually certain 99–100 % probability
Very likely 90–100 % probability
Likely 66–100 % probability
About as likely as not 33–66 % probability
Unlikely 0–33 % probability
Very unlikely 0–10 % probability
Exceptionally unlikely 0–1 % probability
aAdditional terms (extremely likely: 95–100 % probability; more
likely than not: >50–100 % probability; and extremely unlikely:
0–5 % probability) may also be used when appropriate
6Moss, R., & Schneider, S. H. (2000). “Uncertainties–Guidance Papers on the Cross Cutting Issues
of the Third Assessment Report of the IPCC.” World Meteorological Organisation: 33–51.
7Mastrandrea, M. D., Field, C. B., Stocker, T. F., Edenhofer, O., Ebi, K. L., Frame, D., et al.
(2010). Guidance Note for Lead Authors of the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report on Consistent
Treatment of Uncertainties. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 2010. Retrieved
from http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/supporting-material/uncertainty-guidance-note.pdf.
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11.3.1 Conﬁdent Predictions
We have conﬁdent predictions when we have multiple lines of evidence that
indicate the same thing. These would be things that models are likely or very likely
to be correct about. This would apply to one of the broadest metrics of a change in
the climate: the global average surface temperature. But it also illustrates the
complexities of prediction and some of the uncertainties.
11.3.1.1 Temperature
First, a deﬁnition: By surface temperature, we mean the temperature of the air near
the surface of the earth. Practically, this is the temperature a weather forecast gives,
and what you would feel if you walked outside. At any place and time it varies
tremendously, but if you add up the temperature everywhere for a year, you are just
measuring the heat content of the whole planet’s surface, and this has to be con-
strained by the amount of energy in the system.
In Fig. 11.2, the scenarios indicate different increases in greenhouse gases from
the Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs) described in Chap. 10 and
shown in Figs. 10.7 and 10.8. More greenhouse gases result in trapping more heat.
We have to put the energy somewhere. The uncertainty in where it goes can alter
the curves in Fig. 11.2. Heat can go into the ocean (especially the deep ocean). Heat
can be reflected away by brighter surfaces. This uncertainty of variability in where
the heat goes is what makes the temperature each year a bit different from the next
and gives the “wiggles” on the curve. But many of those pathways still result in
climate changes: If the surface temperature stays similar, the heat goes into the
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Adapted from IPCC WGI AR5 Figure SPM-7AYear
Fig. 11.2 Simulated global average surface temperature from climate models. Historical
simulations in gray. Future RCP2.6 simulations in blue, RCP8.5 simulations in red. Darker
colored lines are the multi-model mean. Also shown are the last-20-year mean and range from
RCP2.6 (blue), RCP4.5 (light blue), RCP6.0 (orange), and RCP8.5 (red). Figure adapted from
IPCC Working Group 1 Fifth Assessment Report, Summary for Policy Makers, Fig. 7a
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clouds get brighter and cool some parts of the planet, some places get colder, while
others can still warm. Even with no net global change, there can still be regional
changes in climate.
The spread in results from the different formulations of climate models is due to
different forcing and different responses to forcing. The response to a forcing includes
all the feedbacks in the system that determine (in Fig. 11.2) how the system will
respond to climate forcing. A larger response to the same forcing is a more sensitive
climate (higher sensitivity). Note in particular that given the spread in models (model
uncertainty, the shaded regions in Fig. 11.2), the scenario uncertainty is dominant
after 2060 or so (the shaded regions no longer overlap). The model predictions of this
scenario are within these bands, and thus the resulting surface temperature really
depends on the scenario uncertainty after the middle of this century. The current
generation of models is not likely to be very wrong. Counting on the scientiﬁc
community to be very wrong on these metrics is not a prudent strategy.
The global surface temperature record is far from smooth, which makes
understanding and attributing these large-scale curves difﬁcult. In fact, there is
plenty of evidence of the “ﬁts and starts” to the global average surface temperature.
This is illustrated in Fig. 11.3, showing the historical temperature changes from
1870 to 2010 from observations (black lines) and model simulations of these
changes. There are multiple black thick lines reflecting different observational data
sets: these overlap for the last 50 years or so but deviate from each other before that.
Some of the big sudden dips in models and observations occur due to volcanic













Fig. 11.3 Global average temperature anomalies, 1870–2010. Global average surface temperature
anomalies from IPCC WGI 5th Assessment report models. Different models are different thin
colored lines. The multi-model mean is the thick red line. Different temperature data sets are thick
black lines. Anomalies taken from 1961 to 1990. Dashed vertical lines indicate the dates of named
volcanic eruptions. Figure adapted from IPCC Working Group 1 Fifth assessment report, Fig. 9.8
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gas condenses rapidly to form small aerosol particles (not unlike water vapor
condensing to form water or ice particles). These particles are smaller than cloud
drops, but they do reflect light, and scatter some of it back to space, thus cooling the
planet. The gas emissions are estimated and put into models (climate models do not
“predict” volcanoes).
The other wiggles on a year-to-year timescale may be due to things like El Niño,
which warms the planet a bit during the “warm” phase and cools a bit during the
“cold” phase. The overall ﬁts and starts in the trend (such as the cooling from 1950
to 1970, and warming from 1980 onwards) are due to the forcing: the combination
of increases in greenhouse gases (warming) and increases in cloud brightening due
to aerosols (cooling).
Also note in Fig. 11.3 the flattening of the trend, particularly in observations,
over the past decade. The models generally do not see quite as much of a change in
trend. The reasons for the reduced trend are unknown, but there has been potentially
an increase in small volcanoes in the past decade, as well as possible changes to the
ocean circulation. This is still an active area of research. The years 2014 and 2015
were the warmest on record, so this temporary hiatus in the rise of the global
average temperature (similar to what happened from 1950 to 1970) may be fading.
So we are adding more energy to the system by trapping more heat with
greenhouse gases. That heat has to go somewhere. Models project at least some of it
is warming the planet. This record goes in ﬁts and starts with the vagrancies of
year-to-year variability, but models broadly agree with the historical record in
Fig. 11.3. Model predictions of temperature changes are based on sound theory and
the basic physics of the energy budget.
Could all models be wrong? This would require a very different understanding of
the physics of the earth system. The magnitude of the warming is highly uncertain
due to differences in treatment of the feedback response to a forcing, largely due to
clouds. But it is very difﬁcult to make a climate model not warm in response to
adding greenhouse gases and still have a good representation of the present-day
climate system. The upper bound on the range is less certain, but it is also hard to
make a model too sensitive in the present-day climate. And the simple stability of
the climate system over the past record (millions of years) is some evidence that the
system cannot be “too unstable.” So although it is possible for these projections to
be wrong, it is unlikely.
One further aspect of changes to surface temperature is also observed: the ten-
dency for high latitudes to warm more than the global average. This is seen in
Fig. 11.4, based on model projections. This ampliﬁcation of climate change at high
latitudes is a consequence of strong regional feedbacks related to surface albedo: As
the polar regions warm, snow and ice melts, and a strong positive local albedo
feedback means that the now-darker land and open ocean surface can take up more
heat. Also, because the heat in polar regions is transported from the tropics and then
lost to space in the infrared wavelengths (see Fig. 5.3), more greenhouse gases
interfere with the heat loss, and cause a larger warming. The tropics get heat from
the sun and export it, and so the balance is not as affected by the infrared (long
wavelength) changes due to greenhouse gases. The ampliﬁcation is robust, but the
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quantitative magnitude of the ampliﬁcation is not that certain (as it is not
constrained).
11.3.1.2 Precipitation
Perhaps a more critical question when trying to understand predictions of climate
change is to understand what will happen to precipitation. The amount and timing of
precipitation is important for the climate of a place. As indicated in Chaps. 5–7,
water is an important part of the energy budget of the climate system for the
atmosphere, ocean, and land. Since we know the mass of water and the energy are
constrained, this puts large-scale constraints on changes to precipitation. The con-
straints are strong on a global basis and get weaker when regional changes are
considered. There are few large-scale constraints on the small scales of precipitation
that we normally view as “weather” (perhaps the most important kind). Precipitation
predictions fall into the “likely” category, with global estimates “very likely.”
On the global scale, water in the atmosphere has to be evaporated from the
surface of the earth, and this takes energy. So the amount of precipitation globally
has to be balanced with the amount of evaporation from the surface. In a warmer
world, the atmosphere holds more water vapor, by the simple physical law that
warmer temperatures allow more water to remain in the vapor phase. The increase
of water vapor is about 6 % per degree centigrade of warming. This value is seen in
climate model projections, and it is also seen in observations of water vapor as the
planet has warmed. So the air can hold more water, and there is more energy to
evaporate water for precipitation.
There is no explicit law for how much precipitation will increase, but most model
simulations indicate that the increase is about 2 % per degree centigrade of warming.
RCP 2.6 RCP 8.5
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Adapted from IPCC WGI AR5 Figure SPM-8A
Fig. 11.4 Map of simulated average surface temperature change between the present (1986–2005)
and the future (2081–2100) from IPCC WGI 5th Assessment report models (Moss and Schneider
2000). Stippled regions represent signiﬁcant changes, hatched regions non-signiﬁcant changes.
Changes are larger in simulations using RCP8.5 (right panel) than RCP2.6 (left panel).
Figure adapted from IPCC Working Group 1 Fifth assessment report Summary for Policy Makers
Fig. 8a
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Why is this the case, and why is it robust? Precipitation is controlled by the surface
energy budget, and climate scientists often compare the mass of water in the atmo-
sphere to the energy hitting the surface of the earth based on howmuch energy is used
to evaporate water (latent energy). The amount of precipitation is a function of how
much heat can be radiated away in the atmosphere to balance the latent heat of
condensation. The increase in energy is not as fast as the increase in the availablewater
vapor in the air. There is not a ﬁxed law for this, but it is a result of many models.8
The enhanced water vapor in a warmer world is also expected to change pre-
cipitation patterns, as illustrated in Fig. 11.5. Since the air holds more water, in the
tropics where the air is rising, more of this water is condensed, leading to increases in
the average precipitation. The intensity of the upwelling needs to be balanced in the
subtropical regions by downwelling, which is also projected to increase, drying these
regions of the planet. The pattern can be seen in Fig. 11.5 from most of the models.
The tropics get wetter, and the subtropics get drier. The changes to the general
circulation are “fairly” robust (they are “likely”)—based on sound arguments and
models—but we do not have any proven theory or clear observations, so this only
rests on one or two pieces of evidence (see Fig. 11.1) even at the global level.
When we think about speciﬁc regions and regional precipitation, then these
large-scale arguments about global averages no longer are a constraint, and regional
results are far less certain. The key to thinking about more certain predictions is
understanding what they are based on, and whether the observational constraints are
good (like the global energy being nearly in balance), whether there are good
observations, and whether the models are effective at reproducing observations for
0 10 20 30 40 50
(%)
Adapted from IPCC WGI AR5 Figure SPM-8B
RCP 2.6 RCP 8.5
Fig. 11.5 Map of the model simulated change in average precipitation between the present (1986–
2005) and the future (2081–2100) from IPCC WGI 5th Assessment report models (Moss and
Schneider 2000). Stippled regions represent signiﬁcant changes, hatched regions nonsigniﬁcant
changes. Changes are larger for RCP8.5 (right panel) than RCP2.6 (left panel). Figure adapted
from IPCC Working Group 1 Fifth Assessment Report, Summary for Policy Makers, Fig. 8b
8He, J., Soden, B. J., & Kirtman, B. (2014). “The Robustness of the Atmospheric Circulation and
Precipitation Response to Future Anthropogenic Surface Warming.” Geophysical Research
Letters, 41(7): 2614–2622.
11.3 What Is the Conﬁdence in Predictions? 209
the historical period. None of these is a guarantee, but it points to some sense of
understanding, observations, and reproducibility that increases conﬁdence in pro-
jections (see Fig. 11.1).
11.3.2 Uncertain Predictions: Where to Be Cautious
Precipitation is a classic case where some aspects of the impacts of climate change
are well known, and some are much more uncertain. As noted briefly in Chap. 10,
as the spatial scale of interest decreases, the large-scale constraints fall away, and
potential model structural errors start to become larger.9 While models agree on the
sign and even some of the magnitude of global trends, they do not agree on the
magnitude (even the magnitude of global changes), and particularly on what hap-
pens in different regions. These projections are less certain, or “as likely as not” in
IPCC language from Table 11.1.
For temperature and precipitation, the broad regional patterns (wetter tropics,
drier subtropics, warming high latitudes) are known, but the details of those patterns
are highly uncertain, as is clear from Figs. 11.4 and 11.5. “Broad scale” means
relying on the global energy budget, and global trends are fairly certain, but other
classes of results are less certain.
In particular, the magnitude of many of these changes is not well known. While
most models predict that the polar regions will warm faster than the rest of the
planet (Fig. 11.4), the magnitude and speed of the warming is not well constrained.
In addition, along with such warming as we have already seen in the Arctic has
come a dramatic reduction in the sea-ice coverage (area).10 This is illustrated in
Fig. 11.6a from models. The region in gray is the spread of model simulations of
the historical period. Models are pretty good at following the observed decline of
the Arctic sea-ice extent, but they do not fully capture the magnitude (steepness) of
the trend. Here is a case where projections indicate that in September the Arctic will
likely be mostly free of ice by some date in the 21st century; it is mostly a question
of when.
But that is not to say the models are doing that well. If we look in the Antarctic
sea ice (Fig. 11.6b), which is generally more stable than the Arctic sea ice, models
are predicting slight declines over the past 30 years, whereas the observations
indicate increases in the extent of late summer sea ice. The spread of models is also
very large. So while models seem to represent the Arctic well, it is not clear that
they represent the Antarctic well. The reasons are complex and likely have to do
9Hawkins, E., & Sutton, R. (2009). “The Potential to Narrow Uncertainty in Regional Climate
Prediction.” Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society, 90(8): 1095–1107.
10Stroeve, J. C., Serreze, M. C., Holland, M. M., Kay, J. E., Malanik, J., & Barrett, A. P. (2012).
“The Arctic’s Rapidly Shrinking Sea Ice Cover: A Research Synthesis.” Climatic Change, 110(3
4): 1005–1027.
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with interactions among the ice, ocean, and atmosphere. Our observations around
Antarctica are spotty, and this may contribute to the lack of constraints on models.
Similar issues occur at smaller spatial and time scales. Although the high-latitude
warming “ampliﬁcation” seen in Fig. 11.4 is robust, the magnitude of the warming
is widely different among climate models. This obviously is also true of the global
average surface temperature change: For a given scenario in Fig. 11.2, the spread of
estimates of surface temperature change by the end of the 21st century is nearly 2 °
C (5 °F), which is half of the 4 °C (8 °F) multi-model mean change. This is a large
uncertainty. Obviously narrowing this uncertainty, and continuing to push models
to better resolve smaller-scale features, is one of the goals of climate modeling and
model development. We discuss extreme events that are highly uncertain in
Sect. 11.3.4, after we discuss possible “bad” predictions.
One area where models do predict increases in extreme events is an increase in
heavy precipitation. With more water vapor in the air, and a change to the cooling
of the atmosphere, the regions of upward motion (which causes rain) are expected
to increase their vertical motion, and perhaps decrease their extent. The increasing
vertical velocity and more water vapor in the air would drive increased moisture
convergence at low levels, and more intense precipitation. The magnitude is
uncertain, and the mechanism is also somewhat uncertain, but most models show
such an effect with warming of the surface.
Another uncertain prediction concerns the role of the carbon cycle in the future.
As discussed in Chap. 7, currently the ocean and land surface take up about half of





















Fig. 11.6 Fall sea ice. Past and future simulated sea ice extent in the a Northern (September) and
b Southern (March) Hemispheres. Model simulations for RCP8.5 in black (past) and red (future).
Multi-model mean is the thick line. Observations of sea-ice extent for each hemisphere are shown
in blue. Model simulations are from the 5th IPCC assessment report. Figure from Jan Sedlacek,
ETH-Zürich
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CO2 may yield higher growth efﬁciency. The growth of plants pulls carbon dioxide
from the atmosphere into plant tissue and into the soil. Thus the terrestrial carbon
uptake is more efﬁcient and may increase CO2 uptake. Many climate models that
include a carbon cycle predict this effect. But it is uncertain because there are
competing effects: Plants may grow more efﬁciently and use water more efﬁciently
with higher CO2, but increased heat stress may reduce growth. Because the result
comes from a balance of offsetting uncertain processes, that makes the net effect
uncertain. It is also an effect easy to observe in a controlled experiment, but it is
hard to scale up such observations to a global-scale carbon uptake.
So when are projections likely to be uncertain? When there is less of a constraint
from the physics of climate or observations. For example, the changes to water
vapor are fairly certain, because they are based on proven physical laws. The
changes to precipitation are a further step removed from those physical laws
because they involve more complex cloud processes, and they are therefore less
certain. The changes to the general circulation are fairly certain, but speciﬁc
regional changes are less certain. The changes to the carbon cycle rely on com-
pensating effects, which are probably even more uncertain.
11.3.3 Bad Predictions
Climate models are not perfect, and they are only as good as the observations and
our understanding. Where observations and understanding are lacking and uncer-
tain, we are in the space of Fig. 11.1. Where we only are looking at a weak pillar of
knowledge (closer to the origin in Fig. 11.1), then predictions based on that
understanding will also be highly uncertain, and they may be totally wrong.
Understanding where models are likely to be wrong, or where they are likely to
have the range of projected impacts change (expanded or moved), is critical for
assessment of model results.
What do we mean by a “bad prediction”? Generally, a bad projection would be
where the actual result is outside of the error bars or uncertainty range that we
specify for a particular parameter or metric. The result is “unexpected.” These are
places to watch out for. Bad predictions usually result from not understanding the
uncertainty, and making predictions based on models that are uncertain or are not
well backed up by observations and theory. This is also called Overconﬁdence. In
this context, a projection based on model output becomes “bad” if the uncertainty is
wrong. In Fig. 11.2, if the spread in models for the future looked like the past (very
small spread), then the odds of the projection’s being wrong would be much higher.
So one of the best ways to avoid bad predictions is to be very careful about
understanding total uncertainty.
In general, such lack of understanding of uncertainty (which is often not properly
expressed) comes from uncertainty in knowledge (theory) or in observations.
Perhaps the best example of this is the projection of sea-level rise due to climate
change, where the range of estimates from models (and expert judgment) continues
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to change,11 and where models have a hard time simulating the sparse observations
available. Sea-level rise occurs because of melting of land-based glaciers and ice
sheets that adds water to the ocean. But it also occurs because increasing the
temperature of the ocean causes it to expand and take up more volume (thermal
expansion). In addition, there are local changes in the land surface due to rebound
after melting of ice sheets from the last ice age. Parts of North America are rising or
sinking relative to the ocean because the tectonic plates of the earth’s crust are still
adjusting to the removal of the ice sheets from the last ice age, in a way similar to
how a piece of soft foam gradually restores it shape after a weight is removed.
Generally we only think of the ﬁrst issue: adding water to the ocean. Melting
floating sea ice does not change the sea level, in the same way that ice melting in a
glass does not cause the glass to overflow.
Predictions of sea-level rise are changing as we learn more about ice sheets. In
particular, the Greenland ice sheet is thought to be critical for global sea-level rise
due to ice sheet melting. Sea level rise projections made in 2013 explicitly stated
that they were estimating the ocean thermal expansion only, and could not quan-
titatively estimate the contribution of additional ice sheet melting to sea level rise.12
Thus, taking the model projection as being representative ignores the uncertainty
and may underestimate the change.13 Current projections now try to simulate the ice
sheets themselves, and to take into account the dynamics of ice sheets, particularly
Greenland. But models have a hard time reproducing the present estimated rate of
loss of the ice sheet. This current loss is occurring because of melting and because
of changes to the flow of the ice sheet. Constraining the mass of the Greenland ice
sheet is difﬁcult. Estimates of the extent and elevation (volume)14 are matched with
satellite estimates of the mass of the Greenland ice sheet.15 But both estimates have
uncertainties much larger than the estimated mass loss, so that is not much of a
constraint. Estimates are also made from regions where the temperature is above
freezing and melting is occurring.16 But all this adds up to lots of uncertainty.
Recently, additional processes have been discovered that can change the flow of
the ice sheet, such as water flowing down from the surface through cracks in the ice
sheet to the base, where it potentially can make the base of the ice sheet easier to
11See, for example, Bamber, J. L., & Aspinall, W. P. (2013). “An Expert Judgement Assessment of
Future Sea Level Rise From the Ice Sheets.” Nature Climate Change, 3:424–427.
12These projections of sea-level rise come from the 2013 IPCC report.
13Rahmstorf, S., Foster, G., & Cazenave, A. (2012). “Comparing Climate Projections to
Observations up to 2011.” Environmental Research Letter, 7:044035.
14Zwally, H. J., Giovinetto, M. B., Li, J., Cornejo, H. G., Beckley, M. A., Brenner, A. C., et al.
(2005). “Mass Changes of the Greenland and Antarctic Ice Sheets and Shelves and Contributions
to Sea-Level Rise: 1992–2002.” Journal of Glaciology, 51(175): 509–527.
15Veliconga, I., & Wahr, J. (2005). “Greenland Mass Balance From GRACE.” Geophysical
Research Letter, 32:L18505. doi:10.1029/2005GL023955.
16Van den Broeke, M., Bamber, J., Ettema, J., Rignot, E., Schrama, E., Jan van de Berg, W., et al.
(2009). “Partitioning Recent Greenland Mass Loss.” Science, 326(5955): 984–986.
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slide.17 Enhanced flow can make glaciers at the edge of ice sheets flow faster (more
icebergs). Models are attempting to simulate this. But the current versions of ice
sheet models, even when trying to simulate these bottom (basal) lubrication pro-
cesses, have not been able to get much mass loss at a rapid rate, and not as fast as
observations over the past 20 years or so. This is a serious deﬁciency in model
evaluation, and one reason why projections of sea-level change are so uncertain.
But as new processes are discovered, this may change. Or maybe estimates will be
revised downward as we better understand the simulations and pieces of them. As
long as we know what is missing and what the uncertainty is, we can gauge whether
a prediction is wrong, and also in what direction. Is a projection an overestimate or
underestimate? Or an upper or lower limit?
Thus, what really makes a projection “bad” is overconﬁdence, or underrepre-
sentation of uncertainty. Often uncertainty is stated somewhere, but not presented
well or ignored. The lesson is always to try to understand a projection’s stated
uncertainty. This is true in general, not just for climate models. The best practice for
using models is to go back to the model documentation or description to make sure
a proper representation of uncertainty is available, and an analysis of the model ﬁt
for the purpose is assessed. For example, projections of changes to a phenomena
based on models with a bad representation of the present phenomena (like the South
Asian summer monsoon, for example) may fall into this category.
11.3.4 How Do We Predict Extreme Events?
Some special mention needs to be made for extreme events. These are the infre-
quent tails or extremes of a distribution, which occur with low probability. No one
gets killed by the global average temperature: It is extreme events at local scales
that cause havoc and damage. How do models simulate these events? What cate-
gory do they fall into? Many types of extreme events are well observed and pre-
dicted from hours to a week in advance by weather models.
There are a diversity of extreme events at the tails of the distributions that make
up climate. We can easily envisage high and low temperature extremes, and
damaging rainstorms. Tropical cyclones (hurricanes), windstorms, and snowstorms
are further examples. But extreme events also happen in time. One day of
record-high or -cold temperatures is one thing, but a sequence of events together
like a heat wave, where temperatures remain high, is even more damaging. Or take
a month with above-average rainfall at a location. If it occurs evenly over the
month, perhaps that is not so bad, but if all of the rain occurs in three consecutive
days, that could be a real problem.
17For an overview and some great pictures, see Appenzeller, T. (2007). “The Big Thaw.” National
Geographic, 211(6): 56–71.
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One reason that extreme events are hard to project is that they are often hard to
simulate in the present day. There are several classes of events that fall into this
category. Persistent events, such as droughts or heat/cold waves are good exam-
ples. They are large-scale, but infrequent, and may depend on complex interactions
that give rise to stationary patterns. Even weather models at ﬁne scales often have a
hard time predicting these events.
Another reason why extremes are hard to project is that they occur on small
spatial and time scales. Extreme precipitation events and floods generally occur in
local regions, based on local topography of a single valley that cannot be repre-
sented in a global model. Or the interactions may be small scale and depend on
resolving small-scale features such as tropical cyclones, which have known, but
complex circulations (e.g., swirling rain and cloud bands, a dry “eye” at the center).
So what can climate models say and how? As discussed earlier, there are often
two ways of projecting extreme events. One is to try directly to simulate them,
which for persistent heat and cold, or dry and wet events, should be possible in
climate models. As yet, models are struggling with representing the stationary flow
patterns observed in the atmosphere that give rise to many of these events. These
persistent patterns are blocking patterns, mentioned in Chap. 10: a different than
usual flow of weather systems that persists for a few weeks due to a stationary
pattern in the large-scale storm track. Blocking events can steer storms in particular
ways. The impacts of El Niño on western North America result from the tendency
of the tropical Paciﬁc temperatures to affect the position of the storm track hitting
the west coast. During warm events, the storm track makes landfall in the south,
bringing wet conditions to southern California, but keeping the Paciﬁc Northwest
dry; the opposite occurs during cold events. These large-scale effects can be sim-
ulated directly, and large-scale persistent events should be able to be simulated.
The other way to simulate extremes and how they might change is to use proxies
(see Chap. 10) or downscaling the models (see Chap. 5). This is often done by
looking at the large scale and developing a physical or statistical relationship
between the large scale and the extreme events. We illustrate a few application
examples in the next section.
11.4 Climate Impacts and Extremes
There are many different dimensions of using climate models to estimate impacts of
climate change, typically by estimating changes to extreme events. Here we briefly
present a few examples: ﬁrst, the application of climate models to predict tropical
cyclones, and, second, the application to provide a future distribution of stream or
river flow. Both of these methods typically involve downscaling predictions in
various ways. Stream flow typically also involves coupling to a physical model of a
watershed and stream. Finally, we look at using climate model output to simulate
electricity demand, which focuses on temperature extremes. Applying climate
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models to human systems requires coupling to a model of energy use and demand: a
partial model of the anthroposphere.
11.4.1 Tropical Cyclones
Tropical cyclones are an important and relatively small-scale atmospheric phe-
nomena. A climate model at low resolution will not adequately represent tropical
cyclones, but it will typically have weak versions of them: warm-core cyclonic
systems in the tropics that propagate like tropical cyclones but with very low wind
speeds. These can be estimated, and how these “pseudo storms” change in the
future can be used as a guide. Or the “potential” for storms can be derived. For
tropical cyclones, this is often based on an index derived from present conditions
that predict average storm intensity from the large-scale moisture and wind ﬁelds.
These indexes of “potential storms” or “potential intensity” can be estimated in
climate models now and in the future. This is one example of downscaling dis-
cussed in Chap. 5: using large-scale output to represent what ﬁne-scale structures
should be present.
The danger with a lot of these proxy or downscaling methods is the danger of
overﬁtting to the present day: If a measure of tropical cyclones is based on sea
surface temperatures of the tropical oceans, and the current maximum is 82 °F (28 °
C), how will this work if the maximum rises to 84 °F (29 °C)? We are out of the
range of observations. There is no guarantee that the proxy based on sea surface
temperatures will represent the same variability in cyclones now or in the future if
we are forced to extrapolate a statistical model to future conditions that have not
been experienced in the past.
11.4.2 Stream Flow and Extreme Events
We have been speaking of physical models, but derived impacts can also be cou-
pled to climate model output in this way. These can range from physical application
models to economic models. An example of a physical application model might be
a model of stream flow in a particular watershed, based either on precipitation, or
perhaps on precipitation and the wind direction (indicating where storms are
coming from, and which slopes might receive their water). The inputs to the model
might be precipitation and wind, and the outputs stream flow at a point on a river.
Likely there would also be some downscaling involved to generate precipitation
and temperature estimates for particular points or over a particular region that is not
the same as a large-scale model grid. The model of stream flow could be a physical
model related to precipitation and slope of terrain, conditional on the soil moisture
(like a simple bucket model of runoff described in Chap. 7). But the stream flow
might also be purely statistical, or empirical. If you take the historical observations
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based on a series of rain gauges: if there was X mm (in.) of precipitation in 24 h,
then the stream flow was Y. As long as the future rain was never greater than X, you
could estimate stream flow with a mathematical relationship (a regression) between
the observed rain and stream flow.
11.4.3 Electricity Demand and Extreme Events
A more economic application might be the use of electricity (electricity demand) as
a function of temperature in a particular region based on current patterns. Such a
model could again be based on a model of the energy system, but would likely need
to have an empirical component. For example, in the past, when the temperature
was W degrees, then the electricity use was Z megawatts. It would be based on the
current energy system.
In the example of electricity demand, it should be obvious by now that there are
several dimensions of uncertainty. If the future temperature is out of range of
current temperature, then electricity demand must be extrapolated. And the farther
into the future you go, the less valid a statistical model based on the current energy
demand as the system changes. Carefully identifying these uncertainties and
assumptions is the key to prediction of extreme events.
The prediction of extreme events, whether directly or by indirect methods (proxy
or downscaling) is quite difﬁcult. It requires that reasonable assumptions be made
about how events may or may not change in the future, and the best metrics for
them. Direct simulation of many events may be possible, especially for large-scale
persistence events (heat and cold waves), but downscaling methods will remain
important. The key to using statistical downscaling is to limit extrapolating or
overﬁtting. It is also critical to ensure that the model represents the base state well.
11.5 Application: Climate Model Impacts in Colorado
This case study demonstrates the direct use of temperature and precipitation data
from climate model projections. Aspen, Colorado—a city in the Rocky Mountains
—is known as a summer and winter recreation center. High value is given to the
environment, and the political and economic environment supports a proactive
approach to climate change. There are locally funded efforts to directly apply
climate projections to city and regional concerns. The most visible issue being
addressed is the future and the viability of local ski resorts. However, planners are
also concerned about flooding and the potential for catastrophic mudslides.18
18Climate Change and Aspen Impact Assessment, 2014, http://www.aspenpitkin.com/Portals/0/
docs/City/GreenInitiatives/Canary/GI_canary_ClimateChangeAspen2014.pdf.
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The City of Aspen’s area is approximately 5 mi2 (12 km2). The surrounding
county is approximately 1,000 mi2 (2,500 km2), which is approximately the area of
a 32 × 32 mile (50 km × 50 km) grid cell. Length scales for resolved weather
features in a model with that grid size would be approximately 320 miles (500 km)
on a side.19 The area has steep topography, which strongly influences precipitation
and the partitioning of water into watersheds. The topography is coarsely repre-
sented in the climate model. The native model information is, therefore, on a spatial
scale that is far too large to apply directly to the city and county. Localization of
coarser global climate model information by downscaling (see Chap. 8) can provide
additional guidance for expert interpretation; however, it does not overcome the
shortcomings of the global simulation or reduce uncertainty.
Application of model-generated data ﬁrst requires evaluation on the spatial
scales of interest, which brings attention to how well the model has performed over
an observed time period in the past. Compared to a locale with smooth topography,
there are larger uncertainties in the observations, especially for precipitation. The
comparison with the past establishes the credibility of the model performance and
contributes to the description of uncertainty. Straightforward comparison demon-
strates that the temperature from the model compares better than precipitation, a
nearly universal characteristic of climate models.20 Precipitation has large errors
relative to observations. The spatial structure of model and observed precipitation
are poorly correlated at an individual grid point or even small clusters of grid points
(3 × 3 or 5 × 5 grid points).
Standard practice in such applications is to look at the variability of an ensemble
of climate models (see Chap. 10). This, potentially, reveals models that compare
better to observations in a local region. This is also one of the more robust measures
of uncertainty, speciﬁcally, a measure of model uncertainty. It is also a way to gain
knowledge on the ability of models to span observed variability of, for example,
extreme rainfall events.
Model biases at a particular place can often be traced back to speciﬁc processes.
For example, summertime and wintertime precipitation processes differ at Aspen.
There are two reasons for the seasonal difference. First, as in many land regions,
summertime precipitation is caused by thunderstorms, represented in climate
models by convective parameterizations. Wintertime precipitation is larger in
spatial scale; however, wintertime large-scale precipitation is highly sensitive to
topographical details. The intrinsic model error characteristics associated with
convective and large-scale precipitation are different; hence, the error characteristics
of summer and winter precipitation may be different.
Second, summertime precipitation in Aspen is associated with the North
American monsoon, a regional monsoonal flow that brings moisture into the region
19Kent, J., Jablonowski, C., Whitehead, J. P., & Rood, R. B. (2014). “Determining the Effective
Resolution of Advection Schemes. Part II: Numerical Testing.” Journal of Computational Physics,
278: 497–508.
20Climate Change and Aspen Impact Assessment, 2006, http://www.aspenpitkin.com/Portals/0/
docs/City/GreenInitiatives/Canary/2006_CCA.pdf.
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from both Paciﬁc and Gulf of Mexico sources. Wintertime precipitation is more
often associated with large-scale weather systems with a history of propagation over
the Paciﬁc Ocean and crossing the span of mountains between the Paciﬁc coast of
the United States and Aspen. Thus, the moisture sources and relationship to global
climate processes (e.g., El Niño) differ seasonally, and the biases may be different in
different seasons.
Temperature is usually better represented than precipitation. Model performance
and process analysis of precipitation reveal fundamental shortcomings. These
shortcomings are not convincingly reduced by use of localization techniques such
as downscaling. Using multiple simulations in an ensemble can aid in interpreting
uncertainty; however, the different simulations in the ensemble may not reveal a
class or subgroup of models that can be conﬁdently chosen as best for the analysis.
Model guidance for planning follows by looking at time variability over the
region across the ensemble. Averages (spatial, temporal, and ensemble) can be used
to reduce random errors and quantify bias. Credibility and salience (relevance;
discussed in Chap. 12) of model output are established by analyzing past trends and
variability. If past trends and variability simulated by a model are established over a
time span of several decades, then changes of behavior in projections of the future
are imbued with credibility.
Of special note in this case study, the effort has been under way a number of
years, crossing two versions of climate model experiments, from 200721 to 2013.22
The 2007 simulations suggest a likelihood of warming with less precipitation. The
2013 simulations suggest more possibility of warming with more precipitation.23
The uncertainty in precipitation is reflective of the challenges of calculating
moisture transport to a region and conversion of this moisture to precipitation. This
type of uncertainty can be managed in planning by consideration of plausible
scenarios and decision making within those scenarios. This is followed by revisiting
the projections as models improve and observations conﬁrm or refute model
behavior.
11.6 Summary
Good predictions have consistency among theory, observations, and models.
Observations are a key part of having conﬁdence in predictions. Bad predictions are
often made because the uncertainty of an estimate is not known or is improperly
21Coupled Model Intercomparison Project, Round 3. Reported on in Solomon, S., Qin, D.,
Manning, M., Chen, Z., Marquis, M., Averyt, K. B., et al., eds. (2007). Climate Change 2007: The
Physical Science Basis: Working Group I Contribution to the Fourth Assessment Report of the
IPCC. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
22Coupled Model Intercomparison Project, Round 5. Reported on in IPCC (2013). See note 3.
23See also Colorado Climate Change Vulnerability Study, 2015, http://wwa.colorado.edu/climate/
co2015vulnerability/co_vulnerability_report_2015_ﬁnal.pdf.
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presented or translated. The way to avoid bad projections is to understand how the
projection is built, and how certain it is likely to be. Bad projections are likely to
result from models that are not being used for the right purpose.
With respect to current climate model simulations, we are likely to see warming,
and model spread (uncertainty between models) is smaller than the uncertainty
(difference) between possible emission scenarios. Thus, scenario uncertainty, not
physical model uncertainty, dominates the global-scale prediction uncertainty.
We have higher conﬁdence in temperature prediction than precipitation pre-
diction. We have some conﬁdence in global changes to the general circulation, but
regional effects and magnitudes are highly uncertain.
Sea-ice predictions are uncertain: Models can do the right thing in the Northern
Hemisphere, but they do not see the same trends as observed in the Southern
Hemisphere. Sea-level rise projections are still uncertain as new processes are being
added for ice sheet models, and these models currently have a hard time repro-
ducing observations.
Perhaps one way of describing the goal for better climate prediction and
improved models is to move more of the prediction uncertainties from the “un-
known” category into the “more certain” category (see Fig. 11.1). The critical
uncertainties are many that have been listed above. These include changes in
regional patterns of precipitation, and changes in extremes of precipitation as well
as temperature. Predicting the future of these events means representing the events
well in the present-day climate, and being able to compare to detailed observations
of extreme events—knowledge of the tails of the observed distribution of climate
variables.
Key Points
• Climate models provide projections for the future but are dependent on
scenarios.
• Scenarios are uncertain. Scenario uncertainty may dominate on century
timescales.
• Global average temperature projections from models, and even regional pro-
jections of long-term temperature change, are well constrained.
• Precipitation changes are less well constrained in models.
• Projections of sea-ice extent and sea-level rise are highly uncertain.
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